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The populist turn has produced contrasting conceptions of education. Research has suggested that
individuals educated to university level are unlikely to support populist discourses. Meanwhile, pop-
ulism is often understood as a social illness or disease that needs to be cured through education.
This article argues that both populist and anti-populist discourses are fantasies in which education
comprises an ideological grip. In the populist fantasy, education is perceived as being ideologically
controlled by the elite. In the anti-populist fantasy, education is seen as being inherently emancipa-
tory, liberating us from irrationalism and economic inequality. The article concludes not by show-
ing how these ideological alternatives might be reconciled, but by suggesting that we can only
proceed by creating new discursive landscapes where emancipatory education can be understood
differently.
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Introduction
This article will theoretically explore the links between populism and education. We
take as starting point the definition of populism as the discursive division of the social
space between two antagonistic groups—‘the people’ and ‘the regime’ (Laclau, 2005)
—and theoretically examine how those who are guided by populist discourses (e.g.
Brexiters) and those who seek to resist them (e.g. Tony Blair) discursively construct
education. Through a critique of ideology (Glynos, 2001), we aim to explore the
potential role of education as an ideological force, drawing individuals towards pop-
ulist or anti-populist logics. Yet, we do not seek the end of ideology, which Althusser
(1971) sees as the biggest ideological quest of all. Our target is to demonstrate how
the populist/anti-populist opposition is itself ideological, thereby foreclosing the edu-
cational options available.
The discursive relation between populism and education is complex. Some
research studies have argued that individuals who participated in higher education
are unlikely to hold political views in line with populist discourses (Spruyt, 2014;
Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Meanwhile, those supporting populism have been seen as
‘ignorant’,1 ‘less educated’ or ‘uneducated’.2 For such writers, populism is a ‘social
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illness’ that needs to be cured.3 Here they align with critical educators who see the
purpose of education as being to ‘emancipate’ us from the false ideologies that trap us
in oppressive relationships (Freire, 1972; Kincheloe, 2008). There appears to be
other evidence that, intentionally or otherwise, some populist leaders have used the
question of education to mobilise the ‘lower educated’ to their cause (Goodwin &
Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Runciman, 2018). Donald Trump’s ‘I love the poorly
educated’ is just one example of this (Gerrard, 2019). But some tabloid newspapers
have railed against this negative characterisation of the political landscape. A headline
from the British tabloid the Daily Mail claimed: ‘POPULISM: It’s the BBC’s new
buzzword, being used to sneer at the “uneducated” 17 million who voted for Brexit’.4
We later read in the same outlet:
To liberals, the word populist indicates these voters are vulgar, ill-informed and under-ed-
ucated. It suggests a lumpen mass of people—quite different, of course, from the well-in-
formed and well-heeled commentators and political leaders who feel something has to be
done about [the] unsavoury views of the general public.
This article will theoretically examine different discourses of education in contem-
porary western societies and contextualise the alleged populist turn, with its alterna-
tive attitudes to the supposed populist disease and the postulated educational cure.
The article will focus on interrogating the present upheaval by examining how the
purpose of education has been variously analysed in relation to the discourses of gov-
ernance, of the university or of revolution, where identifications shift as divided sub-
jects govern or get governed, educate or get educated, resist or get resisted. Lacan’s
(2007) schemata of the four discourses (governance, education, resistance, analysis)
will underpin the ways in which we see language exercising both formative and trans-
formative power, as shifting administrative arrangements open or close specific
modes of identification (Brown et al., 2014, 2015). Lacan’s notion of the master dis-
course (governance) underpins Laclau and Mouffe’s work on how different forms of
common sense emerge in response to administrative arrangements. They suggest,
‘Lacanian theory contributes decisive tools to the formulation of a theory of hege-
mony. Thus, the category of . . .master-signifier involves the notion of a particular ele-
ment assuming a “universal” structuring function within a certain discursive field’
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xi). By considering how political activity harnesses com-
mon-sense notions, the article will ask how emancipatory education is variously
understood today.
Populism
In everyday discourse, populism often provokes negative connotations (Bale et al.,
2011). In Europe: ‘Given the near-exclusive association of populism with far-right,
anti-European, economico-politically irresponsible and even extremist movements in
the European context, this diagnosis of populism often extends into demonization’
(Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p. 120). Even in more sophisticated accounts
where populism encompasses both right- and left-wing forms, populism is still con-
sidered by many as a threat to contemporary modes of governance. For instance, the
former EU President Herman van Rompuy defined populism as ‘the Greatest danger
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for Europe’.5 More radically, Tony Blair’s think tank, the Institute For Global Change,
seeks to renew the centre against populist politics.6 In academia, there are multiple
and often contradictory understandings of populism (e.g. Gidron & Bonikowski,
2013; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013). These include conceptualisations of populism as an
ideology, as a style, a performance, a strategy or organisation, and as a discourse (see
Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017 and also, different contributions in this special issue).
Multiple debates flourish across these approaches (What is the nature of populism?
What is the role of the leader? Is populism only right-wing populism? Is populism a
threat for democracy?). For our purposes here, however, we shall utilise the definition
of populism as a discursive logic, centred on the emergence of the people as a collec-
tive actor (Laclau, 2005). Here, populism is defined as the discursive division of the
social and political space into two groups: the people, constructed as the linkage of ‘a
series of initially heterogeneous unsatisfied demands’ and the regime, those ‘accused
of frustrating the satisfaction of these demands’ (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014, p.
123; see also Laclau, 2005).
The focus of our theoretical examination is on contemporary manifestations of
populism and anti-populism in countries often included in both the so-called Global
North and Western World. Populist activity, that is activity guided by the discursive
logic described above, has been documented since at least the second part of the nine-
teenth century (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017) and recent populist leaders include
authorities across all continents [e.g. Senegal’s former President Abdoulaye Wade
(Resnik, 2017); Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Jaffrelot & Tillin, 2017);
Bolivia’s former President Evo Morales (De La Torre, 2017)]. However, in our defi-
nition, the notion of ‘the people’ does not have a fixed meaning; it functions as an
empty signifier that ‘take[s] on the colour of [its] surroundings’ (Canovan, 2004, p.
242). The notion of ‘the people’ within populist discourses responds to time and
space and is highly susceptible to national nuances (Pollock et al., 2015). Thus, we
have decided to limit our analysis primarily to countries in Europe and secondarily to
the USA, Canada and Australia.
These contexts have some particularities that need to be acknowledged. First,
right-wing populists have been more successful than their left-wing counterparts in
these regions, with some exceptions.7 Our analysis focuses on the role education plays
in populist discourses rather than on the way ‘the people’ or ‘the elite’ are con-
structed. Yet, the (particular) populist fantasy we examine is unavoidably tainted with
‘right-wing colours’ that might not be generalisable to all forms of populism. Second,
primarily in Europe, populism is a pejorative term, whether right or left, that feeds a
variety of anti-populist discourses. As such, our examination does not offer a frame-
work for examining all forms of populism and anti-populism, but rather a perspective
from which to question the very notion of emancipatory education.
In what follows we will theoretically explore how education is discursively con-
structed by both populist and anti-populist sides. Using Lacanian theory and its later
interpretations by Laclau, Zizek, Glynos and Stavrakakis, we will argue that whilst
populism is a fantasy of the people in which institutionalised education is perceived as
an obstacle, on the anti-populist side education functions as a driver towards episte-
mological, political and economic wholeness. Whilst drawing on the work of aca-
demics, politicians and journalists to illustrate our arguments, we wish to emphasise
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that this is a theoretical article in which we construct our arguments deductively. As
such, we will not justify here any method or data set. Rather, we will begin by concep-
tualising emancipation as discussed by Laclau and later use this theoretical lens to
examine how both sides construct education.
Conceptualising emancipation
A large survey of the academic literature reviewed a broad range of conceptualisations
of education from the point of view of how education is variously aligned with alterna-
tive conceptions of democratic ambitions (Sant, 2019). It identified the existence of
at least eight emancipatory projects, where each sustains its own distinctive ontologi-
cal, epistemological and ethical grounds. This plurality—we suggest—underpins the
contrary ways in which populist and anti-populist positions appear within educational
contexts. Laclau (2007) has similarly argued that the assumptions typically built into
the term ‘emancipation’ do not provide a single political trajectory. He explains how
there are two incompatible lines of thought built into the notion: ‘one that presup-
poses the objectivity and full representability of the social, the other whose whole case
depends on showing that there is a chasm which makes any social objectivity ulti-
mately impossible’ (p. 125).
Emancipation simultaneously means transparency in reaching an ultimate rational-
ity and eliminating power relations. The problem here is that rationality can only be
built within these power relations. In his classic text Knowledge and human interests,
first published in 1968, Habermas (1972) emphasised how ‘“subjective interests” do
not stand outside social totality, they are themselves moments of social totality,
formed by active (or passive) participants in social processes’ (Zizek, 2020, p. 104).
Habermas (1976, p. 348) later spoke of ‘systematically distorted communication’
within those social processes concealing the ‘hidden exercise of force’ (Ricoeur, 1981,
p. 78). Yet, Althusser, and his student Foucault, rejected Habermas’s idea of undis-
torted communication. For Althusser (1971), the notion of the end of ideology was
the biggest ideology of all, whilst Foucault (1997) thought it na€ıve to suppose that
force was a bad thing that needed removal:
The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth
to circulate freely, without any constraints seems utopian to me. This is precisely a failure
to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free
of. I do not think a society can live without power relations, if by that one means the strate-
gies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. (p. 298)
Zizek (1989) suggests that the debate between Habermas and Foucault shields a
more fundamental distinction between the works of Althusser and Lacan. The core
issue, as Zizek sees it, relates to how supposed imperfections in present human prac-
tices provide motivations in shaping future practice, but unlike Habermas, Zizek’s
Lacanian stance does not suppose that these imperfections can be resolved. For
Zizek, life as it is actually being lived is always at some distance from the supposed
model of how it might be lived, or how we would like or imagine it to be. This failure
of fit results in dissatisfactions that are seen as needing to be overcome. This locates,
or activates, desire—a desire that can never be fulfilled.
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Lacanian psychoanalytic theory portrays a subject divided between what she is doing and
what she says she is doing. This division is located differently for different people, and the
type of division determines who you are, who we are, and how power and dis/pleasure
function to secure alignment or non-alignment with particular discursive formulations.
The individual is constituted according to the composition and mode of their identifica-
tions. (Brown et al., 2014, p. 285)
Whilst Habermas had sought to remove the distortions that have arisen in language
by supposing that we could get behind these distortions or ideologies to see the truth,
for Althusser, in contrast, we always occupy an ideologically derived position. We
never have the luxury of speaking from outside an ideology. A particular example that
Althusser (1971) offered was the schooling process. He described schools as an
instrument within the ‘ideological state apparatus’, a device through which the pre-
ferred ways of the state were disseminated with general consent. For Lacan, truth
always evades historically specific constructions of knowledge. In turn, Laclau (2007)
resisted the idea that specific forms of rationality are able to provide comprehensive
depictions of reality. Thus, no emancipatory project could set itself the task of remov-
ing unwanted power, since consensual harmony is not a possibility— differences will
always need to be resolved through historico-political processes. Such projects can
merely adjust the rationalities that guide our actions, as universal values could be
agreed upon. Rather, we exist in a state of persistent adjustment to new circum-
stances, where rationalities both follow and lead our actions, but where the supposed
possibility of alignment between rationalities and actions can never be achieved.
These points are further discussed more fully in different educational contexts by
Brown et al. (2010), Brown and McNamara (2011), Brown (2018) and Brown et al.
(2019).
Emancipation, however, operates as an illusion in numerous fantasmatic narra-
tives. In the Lacanian framework, fantasies are ideological mechanisms that tell us
what and how to desire. We are unavoidably incomplete, fragmented and dissatisfied.
Fantasies create a consistent narrative that allows us to explain the reason for our dis-
comfort and the ways in which we can ease such discomfort. In this respect, ‘fantasy
can be understood as a schema linking the subject to socio-political reality’ (Glynos &
Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 262). This happens through what Lacan defines as ‘object a’.8
Object a is an essential part of the fantasy, it is the bit missing that prevents a fantasy
from being completed and justifies its failure:
Object a can be understood here as the remainder produced when that hypothetical unity
breaks down, as a last trace of that unity, a last reminder thereof. By cleaving to that rem
(a)inder, the split subject, though expulsed from the Other, can sustain the illusion of
wholeness; by clinging to object a, the subject is able to ignore his or her division. (Fink,
1995, p. 59)
The notion of emancipation is familiar in multiple fantasmatic narratives, but
emancipation is the impossible moment in which object a is finally reached and social
wholeness is achieved. Emancipatory education is the mode of education that suppos-
edly leads to this climatic moment. The problem is that, as we have argued, social
wholeness is an impossibility, the object a is unreachable and emancipation never
happens. It is through this understanding of emancipation as an impossible climatic
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moment in the fantasy that we turn to examine what we have named the fantasy of
the populist disease and the educational cure, and how this fantasy is treated differ-
ently in populist and anti-populist fantasies.
A populist fantasy
Discursive and ideological definitions of populism concede that the essence of pop-
ulism lies in a discursive understanding of society being divided between a somehow
virtuous people and a corrupt elite (e.g. Laclau, 2005; Rovira Kaltwasser et al.,
2017). Following others, we understand that this populist discourse operates as a fan-
tasy narrative (Zizek, 2006; Salter, 2016). The fantasy tells us what to desire. It ‘takes
the subject beyond his or her nothingness, his or her mere existence as a marker at the
level of alienation, and supplies a sense of being’ (Fink, 1995, p. 60). The ‘people’, in
the populist discourse, functions as a promise of the wholeness that will temporarily
fill the void (Salter, 2016). The term performs a beatific role, promising ‘a fullness-
to-come once a named or implied object is overcome’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p.
147). The elite, in contrast, personifies the obstacle that needs to be eliminated for
the social to be closed (see also Salter, 2016). If the notion of the people promises
wholeness, the elite threatens this wholeness. Emancipation operates as a synonym of
liberation or, in Laclau’s conceptualisation, at the level of power relations. The peo-
ple aim to get rid of the powerful and oppressive other:9
In populism, the enemy is externalized or reified into a positive ontological entity (even if
this entity is spectral) whose annihilation would restore balance and justice; symmetrically,
our own—the populist political agent’s—identity is also perceived as pre-existing the
enemy’s onslaught’ (Zizek, 2006, p. 555)
Here the populist fantasy keeps the subject at just the ‘right distance’ (Fink, 1995,
p. xii) between the promise of wholeness of ‘the people’ and the obstacle of ‘the elite’
and/or the ‘other’. Emancipation is the promise of liberation, but as this promise shall
never take place, the fantasy can be sustained.
Knowledge is ideological
The role of education in this populist discourse is on the side of the obstacle, where
knowledge is ideological per se. Facts are selected not because they respond to a crite-
rion of accuracy, but because they are coherent with the fantasy. In other words, facts
are utilised to the extent to which they are subsidiary to this populist fantasy and its
narrative. That is, they reaffirm ‘a dualistic narrative that remains undisputable
regardless of actual events’ (Waisbord, 2018a, p. 10). We find (at least) two different
ways in which this selection takes place. First, Nigel Farage, then leader of the UK
Independence Party (UKIP) once explained:
“I’ve felt from day one that being part of the European Union was a very, very, VERY
BAD thing for this country. I can’t explain it, but I just KNOW I’m right. And I’ve dedi-
cated myself to it in a way I don’t suppose has been wholly rational.” (Farage, cited by Kel-
sey, 2016, p. 978)
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In this quote, the promise of wholeness embodied in leaving the European Union
(EU) grips the subject like an impulse, a force, that triggered action: ‘I’m right. And
I’ve dedicated myself to it’. It does not matter here whether or not this impulse is
‘wholly rational’. In other words, facts are selected according to this narrative trajec-
tory (Waisbord, 2018a). The assertion of any form of knowledge may suppress the
underlying truth of the statement. For example, the tendency for politicians to assert
that they are being ‘very clear’ is often used to mask their prevarication. Indeed:
for most populisms (facts are) a phenomenon of affect more than of denotation, or the
mere facts—so in that sense as long as you are making the point you want to make, which
the people all know (we have to leave the EU, we have to build a wall. . .), the exact facts,
the exact form of mere speech, mere talk, doesn’t really matter. (Osborne, 2017, p. 9)
Second, in this populist fantasy, what matters is not only the expected trajectory
but also how the beatific object—‘the people’—and the obstacle—‘the elite’ are con-
structed. What populists mainly question is not knowledge itself, but the authority
behind this knowledge. Farage knows that the EU is ‘VERY BAD’ and, as such, no
knowledge coming from the EU will change this perception.
In this populist fantasy, academics are on the side of the elite. Their knowledge is
dismissed as ‘elitist and therefore illegitimate’ (Saurette & Gunster, 2011, p. 199). It
is not the accuracy of this knowledge that is questioned, but the sincerity in the pre-
sentation of knowledge (Williams, 2002). For instance, in his analysis of a Finnish
populist online forum, Yl€a-Anttila (2018) quoted the following contribution:
I mean gender studies’ favourite argument is that outsiders cannot have the expertise to
comment on the quality of their research. Only those patting the backs of gender studies
scholars do. There are scientific disciplines in which that actually applies (as well as spe-
cialities of engineering; I don’t think there are more than a hundred people in the world
who understand the specialty I myself work in), but many ‘humanities’ have, after being
politicised, become totally indefensible. (p. 14)
Academic knowledge, particularly in the humanities, is considered to be simultane-
ously ‘politicised’ and sealed to the opinions of the people more generally, with only
‘those patting the backs’ of scholars being allowed to comment. In this understand-
ing, academic knowledge is not emancipatory. On the contrary, academic knowledge
prevents emancipation. It is the oppressive exclusion of alternative views. It blocks
those who are deemed not to have ‘the expertise to comment on the quality of their
research’ (Yl€a-Anttila, 2018, p. 14). That is, it is a ‘university’ veneer of a ‘master-
ized’ discourse (Lacan, 2007, p. 103).
Education as an apparatus of ‘the elite’
If academic knowledge and research become politicised, then educational activity
performs the role of ideological apparatus in distributing elite knowledge. For
instance, in 2017 the Daily Mail began a campaign to fight against ‘Anti-Brexit Bias’
at universities.10 Since academia and its knowledge was seen as being generated by
elites, populists could appeal to the ‘poorly educated’ since they are more amenable
to resisting the elite’s control, preferring educational practices that escape the control
of the academic elite.
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In this populist fantasy, institutionalised education prevents emancipation in two
different ways identified by Laclau. As mentioned, institutionalised education pre-
vents liberation. What it does instead is reproduce and guarantee existing power rela-
tions, defining who has the right knowledge and who does not. Such education
defines the cleavage between those who know and those who do not. It also prevents
emancipation as transparency and socialises people into understanding the world in a
particular way.
However, the fantasy insists that educational practices can escape the control of the
academic elite. First, they favour the everyday knowledge of the common people.
Populists argue that the people’s inherent knowledge is virtuous, since it is proximate
to everyday life in opposition to the academic knowledge which is alienated from
common sense (Saurette & Gunster, 2011). For instance, the leader of the Australian
One Nation Party, Pauline Hanson, once argued:
Anyone with business sense knows that you do not sell off your assets especially when they
are making money. I may be only ‘a fish and chip shop lady’, but some of these economists
need to get their heads out of the textbooks and get a job in the real world. I would not
even let one of them handle my grocery shopping. (Hanson, cited in Rapley, 1998, p. 333)
Second, populists argue against the adoption of mainstream apparatuses, for exam-
ple Trump’s discrediting of fake news in his Twitter feeds: ‘Don’t believe the main
stream (fake news) media. The White House is running VERY WELL. I inherited a
MESS and am in the process of fixing it.(@realDonaldTrump, February 18, 2017)’
(cited in Kreis, 2017). In one way or another, the populist fantasy seeks for education
outside institutions that can deliver the emancipatory promise.
The anti-populist fantasy
Anti-populism also works according to a fantasmatic narrative that is constitutive of
social reality. Here, the term populism is often accompanied by disqualifying or pejo-
rative terms, where populist leaders are accused of being ‘liars’11 and ‘hypocrites’.12
Those supporting populism are seen as being ignorant or uneducated. This criticism
is applied to populists from both right and left. For instance, Jeremy Corbyn was
accused of feeding ‘the nasty populism of the left’, and of having ‘armies of angry
footsoldiers and stocks of alternative truths to rail against the “fake” news of ‘the
elites’.13 Thus:
in the anti-populist discourse, ‘populism’ functions like . . . an empty signifier, but this time
a negatively charged one: as a discursive vessel capable of comprising an excess of hetero-
geneous meanings, operating as the synecdoche of an omnipresent evil and associated with
irresponsibility, demagogy, immorality, corruption, destruction, and irrationalism. (Stav-
rakakis et al., 2017, p. 30)
The fantasmatic logic of the anti-populist discourse has its own promise of whole-
ness, centred in progress and modernisation (Stavrakakis, 2018). Hence, ‘[c]ontrary
to Francis Fukuyama’s prediction of the end of history, there is an increasing sense
that history is speeding up and taking the wrong turn’ (Terentowicz-Fotyga, 2019,
p. 269). Here, populists are seen as a threat to the achievement of closure with their
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assertions of alternative facts, which are more concerned with the consequences of
globalisation and the omnipresence of liberal democracy. That is, ‘populists challenge
the ideas of a universal project to advance freedom, equality, and human rights, to
globalization, and, by implication, to universal public education’ (Reimers, 2017,
p. 20).
If, in the populist discourse, education is part of the obstacle of the fantasy prevent-
ing emancipation, then in the anti-populist discourse education is expected to deliver
the promise of wholeness. That is, education is seen as inherently emancipatory,
drawing the pathway to fulfilling our desire. We see three different ways in which, in
the anti-populist discourse, education is charged with the task of fulfilling wholeness
and closure: (a) education provides students with the knowledge and cognitive skill to
uncover the populist rhetoric (epistemological wholeness); (b) education provides the
low-skilled with the knowledge and skills they need to avoid being left behind by the
forces of globalisation (economic wholeness); (c) education contributes to political
cohesion (political wholeness). We shall now examine each of these in turn.
Epistemological cohesion
In the anti-populist discourse, populists are seen variously as promoting distorted
knowledge, failing to think critically, or letting their emotions shield the evidence. For
instance, in 2018 the European Commission celebrated a seminar entitled ‘Facts
against fears: how to address populism?’14 Meanwhile, a newspaper opinion piece
claimed: ‘Facts can still defeat populist ignorance—liberals should not give up on
them’.15 This discursive tendency often appears within educational literature. For
instance, Corredor et al. (2018) argue:
Preventing evil (e.g. human right violations and war crimes) depends not only on individ-
ual elements but also on a complex understanding of social-structural factors and histori-
cal dynamics. Without this understanding, good intentions can turn into dangerous
political decisions. For example, the idea of voting against the establishment to ‘bring a
change’ can lead people to support authoritarian or populist leaders. (p. 172)
This appeal to neutral knowledge in the shape of facts, evidence and reason is an
essential part of the anti-populist fantasy. Knowledge and truth are constituted in
relation to the accuracy of facts, the systematic use of scientific method, and the con-
sensual correspondence between assertions and reality. Such an approach promises
an epistemological wholeness reminiscent of an ‘enlightenment’, where science and
reason underpin a modern, prosperous and ordered society (Waisbord, 2018b).
Kant’s ‘ultimate destination’ signals the transparent realisation of reason in the
moment of pure (transparent) emancipation. His account of reason, with education
performing a mediating role, has strongly influenced how education is conceptualised
(Biesta, 2006).
Populists represent a challenge to this epistemological wholeness but steer clear of
poststructuralist, postmodernist or posthumanist understandings of truth, whilst
believing in the simultaneous existence of different regimes of truth and the unavoid-
ably ideological nature of knowledge (Yl€a-Anttila, 2018). In so doing, they ‘offer a
watered-down cocktail of Marx and Foucault—knowledge is ideological and
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historical, it is embedded in social and power relations, and facts are mere cogs in
epistemic systems’ (Waisbord, 2018a, p. 10). They are sceptical to the possibility of a
neutral or consensual access to reality.
The role of education is crucial to struggle against populism. Education is often
portrayed as a way of fostering evidence-based knowledge, critical thinking and rea-
son that might challenge the populist discourse. Thus, if populism is the obstacle to
epistemological unity, education is discursively constructed as the tool to overcome
this obstacle. For instance, the former chief of the Higher Education Authority
(HEA) in Ireland, Tom Boland, wrote in 2016:
We need the capacity for critical thought and analysis, and we need academics committed
to questioning and testing received wisdom, putting forward new ideas and stating contro-
versial and unpopular opinions, and we need government and the institutions to work con-
structively, mutually to support our democratic society. Populism contains a special threat
to all of that. But ‘isms’ that would destroy the values, rights and freedoms of Western
democracy have been defeated before. Higher education must be at the forefront of the
struggle.16
Here, higher education is at the ‘forefront of the struggle’ against populism, as it
fosters ‘critical thought and analysis’. Populism represents a threat to this epistemo-
logical claim and needs to be ‘defeated’ along with the other ‘isms’. Education will,
therefore, emancipate us from the obstacle of irrational populism. It ‘signal[s] the
freedom an abstract individual gains by gaining access to Western reason’ (Kincheloe,
2008, p. 51).
Emancipatory education, however, also signals the contradictory nature of emanci-
pation itself. Freedom is paradoxically achieved through ‘the insertion of newcomers
into the preexisting order of modern [Western] reason’ (Biesta, 2006, p. 7). In search
of epistemological wholeness, transparency is privileged over liberation and existing
power relations prevail. Knowledge based on rationality reproduces a cognitive hier-
archy that nurtures existing cultural, political, social and economic structures of dom-
ination (Odora Hoppers, 2009). Mentions of ‘irrationality’ or ‘ignorance’ hint at
lesser ways of thinking, experiencing and being. As many have argued, higher educa-
tion is often not at the forefront of the struggle for liberation, but rather the institu-
tionalised tail end of the modern fantasy (Santos, 2018). In Lacan’s schemata,
education epistemologically supports rather than resists governance, as in Althusser’s
notion of state apparatus.
Economic cohesion
In the anti-populist fantasy, populists represent an obstacle to the full functioning of
the modern economy. The fantasy relies on a ‘losers of globalization’ theory (Kriesi,
2014) to explain the pathological character of populism (Stavrakakis et al., 2017).
The logic here is that populists are those who have not been able to keep up to date
with the skills and knowledge that modern society requires (Kriesi, 2014). For exam-
ple, BBC news reported on an interview with Tony Blair at the Global Education and
Skills Forum. The report explained:
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The former prime minister declined to be drawn on questions about US presidential can-
didate Donald Trump or the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. ‘When I look at politics today,
I am not terribly sure that I quite understand it.’ But he warned of a culture of political
‘populism’ which was tapping into a mood of resentment. ‘There’s a lot of anger about.’
He said this was playing out in the debate around migration, which he said tapped into
people’s concerns that ‘incomes are stagnating and they aren’t really getting anywhere in
life’. He said the answer was not to ‘blame migrants’ but to ‘get the education and skills’
that could lead to better jobs and opportunities.17
In our analysis, education again performs a fix to mend the populist obstacle. The
phenomenon of populism is not only aligned with incorrect knowledge, but also a
consequence of the distortions that may have arisen from the life conditions of those
supporting populism. Thus, if the obstacle to the fantasy of economic cohesion is the
life experiences in economic terms of the populist sympathisers, the solution must be
in education and skills that lead to better jobs and opportunities. Education will
emancipate the losers of globalisation from the conditions that drove them to support
populist discourses in the first term. Education will therefore liberate us from oppres-
sive economic power relations.
Nevertheless, there are three essential flaws in the fantasmatic logic underlying this
narrative. First, an epistemological flaw is evident in the assumption of a transparent
reality in which certain structural conditions (‘incomes are stagnating’) necessarily
lead to certain ideological perspectives (‘blame migrants’). But such assumptions can
readily be challenged. Empirical research in our contexts suggests that support for
populism is primarily dependent on education, age, gender and ethnicity, but it is
highly debatable whether or not economic deprivation is correlated with populism
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016). A direct connection is not always drawn between those
who are considered to be economically deprived in the statistics of social scientists
and those who affirm that they feel such deprivation (Teney et al., 2014). Structural
conditions are multi-faceted. Those whose ‘incomes are stagnating’ might already
have the ‘education and skills’ and yet not ‘have better jobs and opportunities’
(Brown et al., 2010). Power relations are also multi-faceted. Those whose ‘incomes
are stagnating’ might be migrants themselves and therefore not ‘blame migrants’.
Whilst criticising the nativism embedded within far-right populist discourses—‘the
answer is not to “blame migrants”’—the discourse of economic wholeness draws
upon a racialisation (Bhambra, 2017) of the working class that in itself challenges the
promise of emancipation from power relations.
Second, there is an economic flaw. Both populists and anti-populists are inscribed in
a capitalist society in which wealth is always created at the expense of some. In other
words, the system itself is grounded in the principle of having winners and losers, kept
updated or left behind (Dean, 2008). The promise of economic wholeness implicit in
Blair’s account could only be achieved within certain limits, such as national borders,
at the expense of everyone elsewhere. In other words, only insofar as some form of colo-
nialism rules in which the metropolis ‘wins’ at the expense of the colony; a logic that
seems incompatible with other aspects of this anti-populist rhetoric.
Third, there is an educational flaw, since education systems embedded within capi-
talism operate as a supposed meritocratic system. The penetration of human capital
theory in education ignores the positional, rather than purely substantive, nature of
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educational qualifications (Clarke, 2012). Further, education underpins processes of
selection:
raising the general level of education is not a catch-all solution to fill the gap between the
less and the well-educated in political engagement. First of all, there is the risk of educa-
tional inflation. Education, by its very nature, is meritocratic. The gap between the well-
educated and the less well-educated may very well remain, but at a higher level. The well-
educated may start to acquire extra qualifications, beyond college, such as graduate
degrees and international diplomas. (Bovens &Wille, 2017, p. 168)
Thus, even if the ‘lower educated’ could gain ‘the education and skills’, they would
still remain ‘lower’ educated than their counterparts and still be ‘losers’ in this pro-
cess. Education is not capable of emancipating us from economic power relations,
because economic inequality is inherent to the capitalist system education and
because education itself operates as an ideological apparatus of this system—a justifi-
cation to economic inequality.
Political cohesion
In the anti-populist discourse, populists also operate as an obstacle to political whole-
ness as a result of occupying extreme positions. For instance, in reference to ‘growing
populism’, the former Finnish Prime Minister, Mari Kiviniemi, recently explained in
an interview:
Politics have become much more turbulent than it used to be, which makes it more diffi-
cult to reach political decisions. Finland used to always have two major parties which
could agree on which direction to head in. It meant stable governments, and this is no
longer the case.18
Similarly, when TIME magazine asked European Commission President Barroso
‘What concerns you most about Europe today?’, his answer was articulated along the
same lines: ‘Probably the rise of some populist movements at the extremes of the
political spectrum’ (Stavrakakis, 2014). The populist discourse thus represents an
obstacle preventing political wholeness.
The anti-populist discourse relies on deliberative understandings of democracy. In
brief, in (ideal) deliberative democracy, participants commit themselves to the values
of impartiality and rationality to seek the best consensual collective outcome (Sant,
2019). They commit themselves to Habermas’s (1976) ideal speech situation. The
logic here is double. First, the process of deliberation is assumed to be inherently
inclusive. Regulated communication processes (free, open and symmetrical) can cre-
ate the conditions for fair and inclusive public decisions (Habermas, 1976). Populists
very often represent a challenge to these regulated communication processes as they
view communication ‘primarily as the individualized right to express oneself rather
than a collective opportunity to deliberate that involves both listening and speaking’
(Saurette & Gunster, 2011, p. 214). Second, consensus is to be found somewhere in
the centre (Mouffe, 1998). The ‘radical centre’, or third way, as Giddens (1998, p.
46) explains, ‘can only mean compromise, the “middle” between two more clear-cut
alternatives’. Thus, political closure needs to guarantee the concentration of the ‘ex-
tremes’ into this ‘middle’, one in which, through a process of intersubjective
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rationality, collective reasons are agreed. By placing themselves at the extremes and
by committing themselves to conflict rather than to consensus, populists represent an
obstacle that anti-populists need to overcome to achieve the closure of politics.
Education here is expected to operate as the ‘glue that binds us together’19 in this
centre. For instance, UNESCODirector General Irina Bokova argued that education
should offer a way of ensuring that young people are better included to counter pop-
ulism.20 When addressing the Council of EU Education and Culture Ministers, the
former Spanish Secretary of Education, I~nigo Mendez de Vigo, identified terrorism,
populism and nationalism as the three challenges faced by Europe. He further argued;
‘These could fracture Europe if we fail to invest in education and in the fundamental
values of social harmony and democracy’.21 By investing in the education of values
such as ‘inclusion’, ‘social harmony’ and ‘democracy’, Bokova and Mendez de Vigo
sought to challenge the extremism and the ‘rupture’ that populists ‘bring into’ the
political arena.
The narrative of political cohesion appears to point to an earlier moment of politi-
cal cohesion, before populism suddenly appeared and threatened to fracture Euro-
pean harmony and its supposed democratic politics of compromise. Education here
signals a return to this idyllic past. But of course democracy is itself a fantasy, however
it is constructed as a master signifier. We know such harmonic, inclusive and demo-
cratic society never existed in the first place, not even when the advocates of the radi-
cal centre were in power (e.g. Ahmed, 2004). Then, the deficit—the ‘intruder who
corrupts’ (Zizek, 2006, p. 555)—was to be found in the immigrant ‘other’ who would
not integrate (Wetherell, 2008). Now, the intruder who corrupts is also the populist
who performs an essential part of the anti-populist fantasmatic narrative. The pop-
ulist provides a justification for why political cohesion has not yet been achieved. Only
insofar as populists could be eliminated (or educated into the politics of compromise)
could the social be closed.
Conclusions
For the populist turn and its supposed educational cure, we need to inspect both turn
and cure as two sides of an ideological coin in which people and elite are depicted as
adversaries. For Laclau, it would be mistaken to suppose that either party could be
shown to be correct. That is, for the people, the situation would not be better if the
elite were removed. And for the elite, the populist turn would not be eradicated if the
ignorant were to be educated more effectively. Instead, both sides operate through
fantasmatic narratives.
The role of education in the anti-populist fantasy is essential, but we cannot agree
to it being a panacea since it appeals to an impossible neutrality. Education, in this
view, is considered to be inherently emancipatory, a universalising/socialising
machine of liberalist and capitalist principles. It signals the route to the ultimate
rationality and liberation reached at the end of power relations. But this view does not
acknowledge its own ideological nature. Whilst arguing for open-mindedness, critical
thinking and openness, the anti-populist discourse gets itself trapped in a narrow
understanding of these principles, specifically, a modernist form of education that
does not allow other forms of thinking, experiencing or conceptualising the nature of
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human beings (Biesta, 2006). In its alleged route to transparency, ‘emancipatory’
education creates new power relations and a fantasy of a meritocratic system, in which
everyone can succeed and where no one will be left behind. But the nature of the sys-
tem is intrinsically against this principle. One’s educational attainment itself becomes
the cleavage to justify inequalities. Further, the anti-populist education entails a de-
politicisation of politics where the third way is constructed as inherently good.
Simultaneously, it is a paradox that this populist fantasy, with all of its obvious
flaws, has highlighted some of the impossibilities of education identified by postmod-
ernist and poststructuralist philosophers. Populism functions as the drunken guest in
a polite party, who blurts out painful truths (Arditi, 2007). This populist discourse
has seemingly understood the contingent nature of knowledge and how education
can simultaneously operate in terms of socialisation and emancipation. Accordingly,
emancipation can only happen if education happens outside of educational institu-
tions, since, echoing libertarian traditions of education (e.g. Haworth, 2012), institu-
tions are compromised by their role as ideological state apparatus.
The populist fantasy, however, is also victim of its own inconsistencies. Beyond the
numerous and dangerous problematics associated with right-wing populism, populist
fantasies fail to recognise the impossibility of escaping the ideological constraints
either within or outside institutionalised forms of education. Formal (state) education
comprises a piece of state ideological apparatus. In Lacanian terms, the university dis-
course is in the service of the master and it is the task of the analyst to interrogate the
compliance of the university (Brown, 2018). And we may indeed interrogate a UK
university system steeped in market logic, trying to sell its wares as being useful in the
capitalist marketplace. The logic of the anti-populist is that critical thinking and
knowledge will defeat ideology. But populism seeks to appeal more directly to those
who are troubled by the university’s apparent complicity in the rule of the status quo,
with the experts merely endorsing the master’s will and directly benefitting from it.
Emancipatory education cannot liberate us from power relations, since its own
rationality relies on its own assertions of power in the marketplace. Emancipatory
education necessarily ties knowledge and authority altogether. Knowledge and
human interest, indeed. In Lacanian terms, the master discourse, the operational lan-
guage of governance, is being processed by the university discourse for public delivery
through education or the press (Brown et al., 2014). Lacan explains that a comment
‘is admissible only insofar as you already participate in a certain structured discourse’
(Lacan, 2007, p. 37), but part of the commentator’s self is left out in this encounter, a
gap, marking the divide and producing a split subject. This contradiction is also true
for the writing of this present article. We, as authors of this article, might well seek an
analytic position and yet still participate in competing fantasies. As with any article,
we seek to orientate the field of enquiry according to our own preferences. As Laclau
andMouffe (2001, p. 112) put it: ‘Any discourse is created in an attempt to dominate
the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre’. In
seeking to escape the structures of existing governance, we unavoidably propose alter-
native governmental arrangements. Time metaphors abound in the hegemony of edu-
cational discourses seeking ‘improvement’ or ‘progress’, towards ‘greater
effectiveness’ or even the dizzy heights ‘outstanding status’ or ‘world leading’, thereby
sublimely producing standardised modern notions of change, orientation and a
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correct way forward. But the reflexivity of life can result in us celebrating and protect-
ing our current diversity, rather than nurturing futures that might not allow the new
to happen. Emancipation, for us, is about enabling a critique of the discursive plati-
tudes that have locked our resolutions into overly familiar pathways.
This leaves us with the question of what we would want emancipation to bring
about. How might we conceptualise future paths in education? What would we want
them to achieve? Zizek argues that the now elderly Habermas still prefers routes that
set their sights on consensual happy endings, but for Zizek (2019, p. 4), it is only in
thinking ‘dangerously’ that we can ‘question the presuppositions of human freedom
and dignity’. Laclau (2007) similarly argues in favour of ‘emancipations’, where
the abandonment of the aspiration to ‘absolute’ knowledge has exhilarating effects: on the
one hand, human beings can recognize themselves as the true creators and no longer as
the passive recipients of a predetermined structure; on the other hand, all social agents
have to recognize their concrete finitude, nobody can aspire to be the true consciousness
of the world. (p. 16)
We will fail again but may learn to fail better, or more likely differently.
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7 For example, the Spanish party Podemos and Greek coalition Syriza.
8 We agree with Glynos and Stavrakakis (2008) that this is not the whole story. In Lacan, the link between the
subject and the social reality takes place through the promise of fullness and through the enjoyment of the
body (jouissance). However, we will limit here our analysis to the former.
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9 In far-right forms of populism, as some of those encountered in our context of examination, this populist logic
is often articulated with nativism or xenophobia, with the people being simultaneously constructed against
the elite and the immigrant ‘other’. We will not discuss this here, as it is not the focus of our examination, but
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